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: Special Interrogation Report: Brigadefuhrer Kurt Meyer Command

Special Interrogation Report

Brigadefiihrer Kurt Meyer
Commander
12th SS Panzer Division "Hitler Jugend"
(6 June - 25 August 1944)

B

rigadefuhrer Kurt Meyer remains a
controversial figure in Canadian military
history. As a commander of Waffen-SS troops
in Normandy, he fought the Canadians in the
days and weeks after the Allied landings and
allegedly ordered the killing of prisoners of war.
A Canadian military court at Aurich in occupied
Germany tried and convicted Meyer on charges
of war crimes. Although sentenced to death,
Meyer
received
commutation
to
life
imprisonment from the convening authority,
Major-General Chris Vokes. Meyer was
imprisoned in New Brunswick and West
Germany until his release in 1954. Several
significant political, legal, public opinion,
diplomatic,
and military factors
worked
together to turn Meyer into Canada's most
notorious war criminal. His trial raised delicate
issues of command responsibility for the first
time, while Meyer and his formation, the 12th
SS Panzer Division, became almost household
names in some parts of Canada.
Some Canadians may have genuinely
hated the man and his ideals, but Meyer
garnered curiosity and respect for his abilities
as a fighting officer. A combat veteran of
campaigns in Poland, the West, the Balkans,
and the Eastern Front, Meyer felt most
comfortable at the front of his troops. The
inclination was borne from years of experience
in the reconnaissance role and a personal
disregard for danger. Meyer was among the
best-regarded silver foxes of the Waffen-SS, the

combat
arm
of
Heinrich
Himmler's
Schutzstaffel. Meyer likely did not believe that
he would survive the war; this fact may have
played some part in his complicity in the killing
of Canadian prisoners of war behind the lines.
Winning the battle or to die trying in a heroic
fashion was always his first concern. After
being captured alive, Meyer became the subject
of
several
interrogations
to
further
investigations for his eventual war crimes
prosecution and to assess Canadian and
German battlefield performance during the
Normandy campaign.
The following document gives good insights
into Meyer's background, his unwavering
adherence to the Nazi cause, the obvious pride
in his formation's conduct, and the tactical
battles against the Canadians in Normandy.
This interview was conducted by the G
Intelligence officer at the HQ of Canadian
Forces in the Netherlands on 24 August 1945.
In terms of operational details on the
battlefield, Meyer demonstrated a remarkable
memory, which proved less forthcoming on
other matters during his war crimes trial.
Meyer obviously inflated his own role and that
of the troops under his command in operations.
Canadian interrogators, on the other hand,
added their own analysis of Meyer's claims.
While furnishing an important perspective from
the enemy's side, this interrogation report must
be used with the standard checks for bias and
reliability in any primary source.
Editors
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Divisional Command
1. Kurt Meyer, commander of 12th SS Panzer
"Hitler Jugend," at the age of 35 is the youngest
German divisional commander. In 1933, he
became a member of Hitler's body guard and all
his subsequent service has been with the SS. In
1939, he fought in the Polish Campaign with the
Adolf Hitler Division and subsequently in
Holland and France. As regimental commander,
he took a leading part in the campaign in Greece,
and at the outbreak of war with Russia was in
the forefront of the drive to the East. For three
years he fought in Russia reaching almost the
furthest point to be achieved by the German
forces, deep into the remote Caucasus. Three
times he was completely encircled by Russian
forces during the retreat, and fought his way out
with a handful of survivors. It will be seen that
his experience instilled into him a thorough
knowledge of battle tactics, which stood him in
good stead at the time of the Caen-Falaise battle.
2. Standing approximately 5 feet 10 inches in
height, broad shouldered, thick-set, his whole
appearance dominated by his cold grey-blue
eyes, which fixed one with what almost amounts
to a stare whenever he is talking, Kurt Meyer is

the personification of National Socialism. His
mind, paralyzed with long propaganda, is quite
unable to even consider any other point of view.
His whole outlook is dominated by the peril of
Russia and the Communist threat to Germany,
which reason he gives for his wholehearted
adherence to Hitler and to his teachings. Time
and again throughout the whole conversation he
would t u r n , fixing one or o t h e r of the
interrogators with the cold stare, saying slowly
and distinctly, "As I sit here now, Germany in
five years or less will be Communist." The
English, he explained, had no idea of Russia, its
system of life and its people. They would sweep
away all the western culture such as we know it,
and would set up in its place their own half
developed animal-like existence, which could
only mean the complete disappearance of
western civilization. When it was suggested to
him that Russia might have other things to think
about in the next five or ten years than war, with
pursed lips and the old familiar state, he replied,
"Russia will always have both time and the
necessary resources to do what she likes when
she likes." This he said was the reason why the
Fiihrer had led them into the Russian adventure.
The Fiihrer had realized this peril all along, and
his one idea was to save Europe from the menace
of Bolshevism. He ended one of these statements
with the remark that we should find many in
the camp who would drag the Fiihrer's name in
the dust, but he and those SS men with him
would never associate with these ideas, and
would always maintain their faith in what he had
taught them. When he spoke he spoke quietly
but very firmly.
3. It seemed worthwhile to run over with such
a man the pre-war years, and obtain from him
some idea of how Germany's course of action in
those years might appear to be justified in the
eyes of the German people. The whole question
of Germany's acquisitions prior to the war was
discussed, and Meyer agreed that the British
offer to send Lord Runciman to Prague was a
very reasonable one, but then, of course, the
British did not really understand the problem.
Czechoslovakia, he said, had for hundreds of
years been German, and furthermore, situated
as it was in the heart of Germany, so long as it
existed in that state would forever be a peril and
threat to the very life of the Reich. Could we not
see, he said, that advanced air bases would soon
Kurt Meyer sits on a cot in his cell during his war crimes
trial at Aurich, Germany in December 1945.
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have been used in Czechoslovakia by the
Russians. Therefore, in the German process of
defeating Bolshevism, Czechoslovakia had to go.
He was unable to give any reply when asked to
consider whether this was not a very strange way
of doing business. Against England, Hitler had
no quarrel, and he, himself, with the 1st SS
Division which entered Poland on 3 September
1939, was astonished when he heard that
England had declared war. He never gave up
hope of an agreement being reached between
England and Germany. After the conclusion of
the campaign in the West, Goering's Luftwaffe
was not launched against England, nor were
there any serious thoughts of invasion until Mr.
Churchill's speeches which emphatically laid
down that resistance by the British Empire was
to continue.

had fought. He attempted to dismiss the part
played by the Wehrmacht in a few short
sentences. Time and again when reminded that
the Wehrmacht had also taken a pretty hard
knock he would try to dismiss their part as no
consequence, while showing how if the SS had
not come to the rescue things would have been
much worse. To him, the battle of Caen-Falaise
was magnificent in the best Wagnerian tradition.
As he described his actions and those of his men,
it seemed as though he liked to consider himself
as Siegfried leading his warriors to their death.
When he described how he came out of the
Falaise Gap with sixty men, it is likely that the
familiar strains of the "Twilight of the Gods" were
echoing in his ears. Such is the man Meyer and
his story follows.

4. This, briefly, may serve as a slight
background to those who are interested in the
study of this most ardent disciple of Hitler. One
last point which may serve to demonstrate how
impossible it is for such as he to be allowed to
live in the future world as a normal citizen were
his observations on the German concentration
camps. Having first denied that he knew anything
about what happened inside them, as he said
he had always been away fighting the enemy, he
was again asked whether he really knew what
had occurred inside them. Before he could
answer, a detailed description was given to him
of what had occurred to two Dutch men
personally known to the interrogator. He listened
very quietly and did not reply for a few seconds,
and then slowly turning he stated, somewhat
defiantly, that our soldiers had descended to the
mean trick of taking away watches, rings, and
private papers from his men. When asked if he
honestly considered this a reasonable
comparison, he was quite unable to offer any
reply. His state of mind, however, is well
illustrated by this astonishing comparison which
he solemnly offered as an excuse for the
bestialities performed by the men wearing the
same uniform as himself.

The Division Prior to D-Day

5. On military matters, his mind was crystal
clear, and once having oriented himself on the
map he was able to go through the campaign
phase by phase giving strengths, boundaries,
tasks, with consummate ease. The whole time,
however, his conversation was coloured by the
pride that he had in his men and the way they

6. Prior to D-Day, Meyer was the commander
of the 25th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment and
did not take over command of the division until
13 J u n e on the d e a t h of the divisional
commander, Major-General Witt. For four weeks
prior to 6 June, they had been expecting the
attack, and he had spent his time familiarizing
himself with the various courses of action which
were laid down in advance in case of emergency.
The division was at full strength with between
20,000 and 21,000 all ranks and approximately
214 tanks. The organization of the division
agreed with the normal organization of an SS
Armoured Division with exception of the antitank battalion. When asked, he immediately
filled in the details of the organization of this
battalion, which at that time were lacking. The
anti-tank battalion consisted of four companies
of Panzer IV tanks with long 7.5 cm guns. On
D-Day, however, he had only 22 of these. The
other 22 were not received until late in July.
Within the division were a certain number of
foreigners, approximately 500, mostly Russians
and Italians. His own driver was a Russian, who
gained the Iron Cross, second class. Both Italians
and Russians were mostly employed with the
administrative troops. Meyer said that he was
very familiar with the whole of this District of
France because he had been stationed in the
Orne area in 1942 with the 1st SS Panzer
Division during the time it was refitting after one
of its many Russian adventures. He found this
experience invaluable, since he possessed a
61
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detailed knowledge not only of the lie of the land,
but of the communication system including all
the minor roads.

Disposition of the Division
Prior to D-Day
7. The division prior to D-Day was disposed
as follows:Divisional Headquarters - Aeon
25th SS Headquarters - La Trinite, with the
regiment in the general area
26th SS Headquarters - Dreux, with the regiment
to the north of the town
12th SS Panzer Regiment - general area of
Elbeuf, Louviers, and Neuborg

The role of the 12th SS was to counter-attack
any attempt to land north or south of the Seine.
That was the main reason for having the tank
regiment so near the Seine. The special task of
the divisional engineers was to keep the ferries
open to enable the tank regiment to be used on
either side of the river. The various courses of
action, already mentioned, had been most
carefully worked out so that when the alarm
actually was given, Case I was immediately
implemented, and there was no loss of time in
making up orders for the advance.

6 June
8. At 0200 hours on the morning of 6 June,
Meyer first heard of the landing. He had received
his news from the radar station situated on the
coast, with whom he had special liaison
arrangements. It was not, however, until 1000
hours that orders were received for the 25th SS
Panzer Grenadier Regiment plus the Panzer
abteilung of Panzer IVs to proceed in the
direction of the coast. At this time, the 12th SS,
together with the 21st Panzer, were under direct
command of Panzer Gruppe-West. The first task
of this composite battle group was to move in
the direction of Houlgate, since it was thought
that the landing that had already occurred might
be a feint and that the major blow was to fall to
the east of the Orne. On their way up, Meyer
received orders at 1500 hours when he was at
St. Pierre-sur-Dives to change direction and go
towards Caen and establish communications
with the 21st Panzer Division. The regiment
reached Brettevile-sur-Laize at 2200 hours, and

pushed on the Evrecy. At midnight 6-7 June,
Meyer went into conference with Feuchtinger of
the 21st Panzer Division in Caen, and discussed
the position with him. He is reported by
Feuchtinger [commander of 21st Panzer] to have
considered the British as little fish, adding that
in no time he would have the situation under
control. It was apparently Feuchtinger's idea to
await the arrival of all three divisions, namely,
Panzer Lehr, 12th SS and 21st Panzer before
launching a counter-attack, but in this he,
Feuchtinger, was over-ruled, and on 7 June, it
was decided that 25th SS Panzer Grenadier
Regiment with the Panzer IVs should attempt to
drive through to the sea between Cambes and
Cairon. Left flank protection was to be provided
by the reconnaissance company up to Tilly-surSeulles. On 7 June, this attack was actually
l a u n c h e d a n d s u c c e e d e d in driving the
Canadians from the western approaches to Caen.
By the night of 7 J u n e , the line had been
stabilized with the 25th SS Panzer Grenadier
Regiment's right flank on the Caen-Bayeux road.
Meyer was asked why this attack had not been
successful in achieving more substantial results;
he replied that though they had made every effort
they were unable to do what they wanted owing
to the complete lack of petrol and a certain lack
of ammunition. In fact, his tanks were brought
to a complete standstill, which resulted in the
attack failing in its final objectives. Meyer, in
describing the attack said that our tanks had
actually reached R9969 about two miles from
Caen. His own attack was made with about 40
to 50 tanks, and in the course of the action, he
lost approximately 6. The line was then
stabilized through Galmanche, Buron, Gruchy,
and Point 69.
(Note: Feuchtinger, when questioned on his
reason for the failure of the 12th SS, said that
the lack of petrol was quite untrue since he,
himself, would willingly have given Meyer all the
petrol he needed had he asked for it. Feuchtinger
states that the reason for the failure of the attack
of the 12th SS was because our anti-tank
defences were first class).

9 June to 7 July
9. On 9 June, the 26th SS Panzer Grenadier
Regiment came up and took over the left flank
of the divisional sector up to Tilly-sur-Seulles.
At this time, Meyer spoke of the conference held
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A Panther of the 12th SS knocked out in Brefteville-l'Orgueilleuse by the Regina Rifle Regiment on the night of 8 June
1944. Meyer's interrogators remark that his mind was "crystal clear" on military matters, but he does not comment on his
his failure to capture the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade position in a series of attacks launched between 7 and 10 June.

with Geyr von Schweppenburg [commander of
Panzer Gruppe-West] when it was agreed to put
forward to the High Command in the strongest
terms that further resistance in Normandy
against the overwhelming mass of Allied strength
both on land and in the air could only end in
disaster; and furthermore, they would advise
that steps should be taken at once to retire on
to the Seine, using their armoured formations
to get the infantry out, thereby giving the infantry
the chance to get back behind the Seine.
Needless to say, nothing came of this conference
or of the advice proffered to the High Command.
10. On 8 June, the 12th SS Division came under
command of the 1st SS Panzer Corps. Between
10 and 15 J u n e , the 12th SS Division
endeavoured to limit our progress by a series of
counter-attacks on the left flank between Tillysur-Seulles and the Caen-Bayeux road. At this
time, they were heavily reinforced with artillery,
which included a flak regiment of 88s, one Werfer
brigade with two regiments, a heavy artillery
abteilung consisting of two 17 cm batteries and
one 21 cm battery, and an additional artillery
regiment. During this period and up until the
time that the 12th SS Panzer Division shortened
its line to take over from Gruchy through
Carpiquet to the woods at Tourville, especially

the 26th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment and the
engineer battalion incurred heavy losses. In
addition, the division was forced to send help
in the shape of one battalion of the tank regiment
to the Panzer Lehr Division, who as a result of
the fighting had become perilously weak. On 27
J u n e , it was stated in Allied Intelligence
Summaries that the 21st Panzer Division and
12th SS Panzer Division were desperately in
need of r e i n f o r c e m e n t s . This w a s no
understatement, and though help was given by
a regiment of the 1st SS Panzer Division, which
came on 28 June, the 12th SS Panzer Division
was forced to take up the new positions
aforementioned to the west of Caen through
Carpiquet etc. because as a result of the losses
i n c u r r e d they were u n a b l e to m a i n t a i n
themselves on their original front. Furthermore,
the 2nd SS Panzer Corps with the 9th and 10th
SS Divisions had made its appearance, thus
relieving the immediate situation. Meyer
declared that territorially the positions through
Carpiquet were much more favourable. By the
end of June, his total losses were 1500 men and
over 20 tanks. He had also given a tank battalion
and an armoured infantry battalion to Panzer
Lehr. In the battle prior to falling back on
Carpiquet, his losses totaled a further 800 men.
Meyer interposed with a remark that during this
63
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Kurt Meyer (left) talks with other German officers in the
courtyard of the Abbaye d'Ardenne, June 1944.

regiment, and approximately 140 tanks had been
lost. They were receiving no reinforcements

except the odd Marsch battalion, which In no
way could make up for the staggering losses
which they had taken. Tank reinforcements they
had none. Clearly, the division could not
continue to operate under the old organization
with so many of its best men fallen. With the
idea of producing three units which would
incorporate the essentials of a Panzer Grenadier
Regiment, Meyer reorganized the division into a
series of battle groups, namely Waldmuller,
Krause, and Olbotter. In these groups, they
fought till the end in the Falaise Gap.

bitter fighting he knew of three separate cases
in which one of his men had tied explosives to
his body and jumped on an Allied tank.

8 July
11. As a result of the allied attack on Caen, the
division again endured heavy losses, the 25th
SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment being the chief
sufferer, the first battalion having only 200 men
left, the second battalion a like number and the
third battalion hardly 100. The losses were
caused not by the allied bomber attacks, but
mainly by the flame throwers that attacked
immediately after the bombing ceased, and as
result, caught many of the men in a somewhat
dazed condition. It was only the arrival of the
21 st Panzer Division that saved what might have
been a very ugly situation. Waldmuller of the 25th
SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment together with
Wunsche of the 12th SS Panzer were able to offer
some assistance to the 16th Luftwaffe Division
in their predicament, but their combined losses
had been too great and they fell back to the Orne
where 12th SS took over from point U035672
to Maltot. They were, however, only two days (13
and 14 July) in these positions when they were
themselves relieved by the 1st SS. About 14 July,
the division was ordered into a rest area in the
general area St. Sylvian, Cauvicourt, Brettevillela-Rabet, and Soumont. Divisional headquarters
was at Secqueville. By this time, it was indeed
an emaciated division. The reconnaissance
battalion, one artillery battery, one complete

17 July
12. On 17 July, the tanks of the 12th SS Panzer
Regiment were ordered up into the area occupied
by the 86th Corps, north of the Caen-Vimont
road, since the corps commander had applied
for help, appreciating that there was to be a
further landing or a new allied thrust from the
Orne bridgehead. The tanks, however, remained
only 24 hours and then returned.

18 July
13. 18 July saw the opening of a large-scale
Allied attack, by name Operation "Goodwood,"
but it was not until 20 July that the 12th SS
actually took over the sector of the line that lay
between Emieville and La Hogue. The strength
of the division at this time was approximately
2,000 fighting men only. The tank regiment
consisted of about 50 tanks. From about 20 July
until the opening of Operation "Totalize" on 8
August, a period of comparative peace and quiet
ensued for the division. Though the men were
rested and the equipment over-hauled, no
reinforcements came to them and their overall
weakness was, therefore, not rectified. It had
been the plan to relieve the 12th SS by the 116th
Panzer Division, which moved into the area
around St. Pierre-sur-Dives. But, as a result of
the Allied progress, the 116th Panzer Division
was moved off elsewhere in an attempt to cope
with the serious situation that was beginning to
develop in the West.
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14 During this static period, the main tasks of
the 12th SS, whose headquarters was in the
wood at U1968, were the construction of three
defence lines. All the divisions, the 21st Panzer
on its right and the 1st SS on its left, were
similarly employed since it was felt that some
form of Allied attack to break the German grip
on Caen was the most likely move in the near
future. Appreciating this, Meyer realized that we
would be urgently in need of information
concerning his intentions and his strength. He
ordered, therefore, that by day the companies
should sleep except for two or three sentries. At
sun down, every company would stand-to and
maintain an alert throughout the hours of
darkness. In this way, Meyer was able to
neutralize our patrols and prevent them from
taking back information, which they were sent
to procure. All the tank and artillery crews were
employed on the construction of these three
defence lines, which they were busily preparing.
The first was a series of battle outposts, which
extended from La Hogue on the left up to
approximately the wood U1564. The second ran
from Point 33 to Bellengreville turning east
toward Argences and then north along the high
ground. The third line followed the course of
the Muance River. At this time, one of the first
Flak Sturm regiments of the 111 st Flak Corps
took up positions on the third line, namely the
R Muance. Along the second line, Meyer had had
constructed approximately 40 dummy tanks
which, however, he backed up with 5 real ones.
These tanks, made of wood, were constructed
with the idea of concealing the true location of
the tank regiment, which at this time was down
to about 40 to 50 runners. The real location of
the tank regiment was just to the south of
Vimont, where they were kept successfully
camouflaged, ready, however, to go into action
should an armoured breakthrough occur. During
this static period, however, the rest of the antitank battalion, namely 22 Mark IVs arrived, but
before they could go into action they had to be
thoroughly overhauled and their guns calibrated.
Both Rommel and von Kluge, commander-inchief West visited the 12th SS and on one
occasion at 0400 hours von Kluge with Meyer
went up to visit the forward infantry positions.
Approximately 29 July, the 21st Panzer Division,
right hand neighbour of the 12th SS, was
relieved by the 272nd Infantry Division, and as
the regiments of the 272nd Infantry Division

arrived, gradually began to take over the sector
of the 12th SS Panzer Division. On 5 August,
the 12th SS had in fact been fully relieved by
the 272nd Infantry Division. The division was
b r o u g h t o u t a n d went b a c k into the
neighbourhood of the Liason River and had a
few hours of rest completely out of the line. The
object of this move was to have available an
armoured reserve between the Orne and the sea
should the Allies attempt to break through south
from Caen. In order that the Allies should believe
the 12th SS was still in its old area, Meyer left
behind n e a r Vimont, a wireless set in a
Volkswagen with orders to transmit on the tank
regiment frequency (Note: It will be remembered
that these relays were in fact picked up by our
own special wireless units).
15. Hardly had they been in this position more
than a few hours when an appeal came from the
German forces struggling to hold off the British,
who were attempting to cross the Orne near the
forest of Grimbosq. Krause of the 26th SS
Panzer Grenadier Regiment was sent off with 200
men and 20 tanks to help the sorely-pressed
277th Infantry Division.

Operation "Totalize"
16. Meyer realized that this period of rest north
of Falaise could only be as a drop in the ocean.
While he was up in the Vimont area, he had
noticed that great activity was going on in the
Allied lines. Furthermore, with the situation

Soldiers from the 12th SS Division in Normandy.
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Perfoming maintenance on a camouflaged German tank in Normandy.

deteriorating so rapidly on the Orne front, an
attempt to break the German defences around
Caen was over-due. He had ensured against
being taken by surprise by placing liaison officers
with the 277th and 89th Infantry Divisions, so
that if an alarm was raised he would at once be
fully informed. On the night of 7-8 August,
Operation "Totalize" commenced. The Allies had
already p e n e t r a t e d to R o q u a n c o u r t a n d
Garcelles when the alarm reached the 12th SS.
Meyer at once got into his car and went to Urville,
where he met the divisional commander of the
89th Division, who as a result of the bombing
had little or no idea of the true situation. He
went by the Caen-Falaise road and found himself
in the middle of the bombing. In his own words,
he described the situation thus: "I got out of my
car and my knees were trembling, the sweat was
pouring down my face, and my clothes were

soaked with perspiration. It was not that I was
particularly anxious for myself because my
experiences of the last five years had inured me
against fear of death, but I realized if I failed
now and if I did not deploy my division correctly,
the Allies would be through to Falaise, and the
German armies in the west completely trapped.
I knew how weak my division was and the double
task which confronted me gave me at that time
some of the worst moments I have ever had in
my life." At the same time as Meyer was up on
that road alone, groups of the 89th Division
scattered in panic by the bombing, were making
their way down the Caen-Falaise road as quickly
as possible. Meyer, on perceiving this serious
situation, calmly lit a cigar, stood in the middle
of the road and in a loud voice asked them if
they were going to leave him alone to cope with
the Allied attack when it came. One look at this

66
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young commander was enough and the men
turned around and immediately started to take
up defensive positions. He must certainly have
looked an impressive figure, this 35-year-old
divisional commander, wearing the highest
decorations that the Germans could bestow on
him, quietly but confidently facing this disorderly
mob a n d by his example a n d s h e e r
determination influencing the whole division to
turn back into line and take up the fight once
more.
17. Prior to leaving t h e 8 9 t h Division's
headquarters, Meyer had ordered two things:
first that Waldmuller and a mixed bag of 20
tanks, Tigers, Panthers, and IVs, should come
up and take up positions on either side of the
Caen-Falaise road at Cintheaux. The Tigers had
come from the 101st SS Heavy Tank Battalion,
which joined them just prior to this action, and
consisted of about eight to ten tanks. The object
of moving this battle group to this position was
to stop a breakthrough down the main axis of
advance towards Falaise. The second thing that
Meyer ordered was that Krause, who had been
opposing the British, should return at once and
then together with Waldmuller, should launch a
counter-attack.

6 August
18. As a result of the orders given by Meyer, the
tanks of Krause arrived in two hours, though
his infantry was somewhat slower. The first
tanks, which were seen early on the morning of
8 August, were part of Waldmuller's group which
was observed moving up the Caen-Falaise road,
prior to taking up a defensive position around
Cintheaux. As it has already been mentioned,
Krause was also directed to this place, and once
he had arrived, a combined infantry and tank
attack was made against the woods at U0956,
which, however, was beaten off with losses.
19. In this action, Captain Wittman, of the 101st
Heavy Tank Battalion, was killed. This officer
held the record for the number of tanks knocked
out by one individual. Since 1943, on the
Russian Front, until the time he was killed in
Normandy, he was officially credited with having
knocked out 143 tanks of all kinds. At the time
of his death, he was part of the crew of a Tiger
tank. It has been estimated on 9 August, that

the 12th SS Tank Regiment contained 40 Mark
IVs, 30 Panzers, and the 101st Heavy Tank
Battalion contained 20 Tigers. In fact, according
to Meyer they had only a total of 40 tanks in the
Panzer regiment, and the 101st Heavy Tank
Battalion had only 10. As an afterthought, he
mentioned that there were three assault guns
from Panzer Abteilung 301 available.
20. At the same time as the German countera t t a c k failed a g a i n s t the woods already
mentioned, the C a n a d i a n s s t r u c k heavy
opposition south of the woods in U1160. This
opposition came mainly from approximately 20
Panzer IVs belonging to the anti-tank battalion
of the 12th SS, who, unable to move across at
the time the division moved into reserve owing
to troubles of one kind or another, now emerged,
all repairs completed. As a result of the day's
action and despite the fierce resistance of the
12th SS in company with what remained of the
89th Division, the whole German line was forced
back some 5-6 kilometres.

8 and 9 August
21. During the night of 8-9 August, the infantry
of Krause's group arrived, and were put in south
of Bretteville-sur-Laize. In this way, although the
village itself had been captured, Meyer hoped to
limit our progress on the left flank with the aid
of these additional troops. The infantry and
tanks of Waldmuller, who, it will be remembered,
were primarily responsible for the first counterattack, had by their action stayed longer than
was wise, since the Polish Armoured Division
had all but encircled them.
22. As a result of the day's events, Meyer,
realizing the strength of the Allied thrust, decided
on a new defensive line. He, therefore, went back
to carry out personal reconnaissance of the new
position which he had chosen, and which he,
through long experience, knew so well, namely
t h e Liason Valley. As a r e s u l t of h i s
reconnaissance, he gave the following orders:
Waldmuller was ordered to pull out and make
his way back to Maizieres, via St. Sylvian. Krause
was ordered to fall back and take up position in
the Quesnay Woods, and protect the left flank
by holding Fontaine-le-Pin. The artillery was to
concentrate around Olendon and Tassilly, with
the task of covering the whole divisional front
67
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from including Fontaine-le-Pin to his right
boundary, which passed some 2000 metres east
of Maizieres. In addition to the normal divisional
artillery, Meyer had the assistance of a flak sturm
regiment of approximately 30 to 40 88s, and a
Werfer Abteilung.
23. The preparations, which were witnessed on
9 August by Allied aircraft along the whole valley
of the Liason were, in fact, Meyer's orders of 89 August being implemented, with Krause falling
back on the left, and Waldmuller pulling back
on the right flank. The latter, however, had a very
sticky time and incurred heavy losses. At the
same time as the withdrawal was taking place
on the flanks, the centre was being mainly held
by Wunsche with some 20 tanks. The Allied
tanks had made a dangerous thrust towards the
wood of U1348. On the left, Krause was in
position in the Quesnay woods with about 200
men. Wunsche, collecting everything that he had,
was able to throw back the Allied thrust, which
if it had succeeded, would have broken the whole
of the Liason position before they had had time
to man it. On the night of 9-10 August,
Waldmuller succeeded in returning to the Liason
Valley and took up position from Vieux-Fumes,
to the woods in U1649.
24. It will be seen at this time that the 12th SS
was going though the most critical stage in its
career. Its divisional sector extended for
approximately 9 miles, and its strength was
down to 400 to 500 fighting men and 16 tanks.
The only help that it had was from the remnants
of the 89th Infantry Division, which, Meyer
admitted, was worth very little. On the other
hand, the 85th Division was on the point of
coming in, and, in fact, the cyclist companies
were already arriving, b u t the divisional
commander's statement will be well understood
when he said that if help was not forthcoming
in the immediate future, he could not hold
himself responsible for the further defence of
Falaise. His troops had been in action practically
continuously since D-Day, and were in urgent
need of rest and refit. Finally, they were reduced
to a mere handful. The once proud Hitler Youth
Division, consisting of 21,000 men and 220
tanks was down to a fighting strength of 450 to
500 men and 16 tanks.

10 August
25. The main event of 10 August was the arrival
of the 85th Division, who took over from the
right flank, which was previously occupied by
Waldmuller and extended to Vieux Fumes, to the
Caen-Falaise road on the left. It was a gradual
process, as the division came in according to
the usual German style, namely in small groups.
26. The appearance of the 85th Division had one
important immediate result. It meant that what
was left of Waldmuller's group could be
withdrawn from the battle and sent out to form
the basis of a new Hitler Jugend Division, which
had already been decided upon. Meyer admitted
that it was normal German practice to withdraw
the remnants of good fighting troops from good
divisions, before they were entirely wiped out,
so that a cadre at least, of experienced troops
would be available for re-building the division.

From 11 August - Disappearance of
the 12th SS as a Fighting Formation
27. From 11 August to the time when Meyer
finally came out of the gap by himself on foot,
the story of the 12th SS Panzer Division is very
much the same. Its main tasks consisted of
taking up a series of defensive positions with
gradually decreasing numbers, ending up in the
neighbourhood of Trun, where as a division it
disappeared almost entirely.
28. Once the 85th Division had taken over, the
infantry of the 12th SS were brought out for a
two day rest, though the tanks and the artillery
remained in battle. Before the 12th SS finally
left the Liason Valley, 50 men and a few tanks
under Olbotter were sent by Krause to Bray-enCinglais to help out the remnants of the 89th
Division. On 14 August, when the Allied attack
opened with the object of crossing the Liason
Valley and driving on Falaise, the 12th SS was
thus placed: infantry out of the line, tanks and
artillery supporting the 85th Infantry Division
and the 89th Infantry Division. At this point,
Meyer interposed with the remark that never in
his life had he seen his infantry so completely
tired out. They came out of the lines asleep and
they slept solidly for two days. To these soldiers
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rest was more important than food; in his own
words, they were completely out.
29. The sector that the 12th SS occupied behind
the Liason Valley was in the neighborhood of
Olendon-Falaise-Damblainville. This period of
rest did not last long and with the Allied threat
growing more dangerous hourly through the fall
of the Liason Valley position, the 12th SS
Division, now reduced to 300 men and 11 tanks,
was once more brought in for the final defence
of Falaise. The actual positions that were taken
up by the division were pointed out by Meyer.
The division was split as follows: 80 men in
Falaise, who it will be remembered, were

the scene with some 300 reinforcements and
what he had been able to procure from the
administrative troops, who had left the area over
ten days before. He, according to Meyer, was
given the task of keeping the exit from the
Cauldron open. Meyer was not certain where
Waldmuller was located but believed it to be in
the area of Grand-Mesnil. One last position was
taken up by the last 60 men of the 12th SS inside
t h e c a u l d r o n ; t h i s p o s i t i o n was in the
neighbourhood of Vignates. When this had finally
been over-run, Meyer reported for orders to
Hausser, commander of the 7th Army, who was
still inside the cauldron, and it was arranged
t h a t he, together with Meindl of the 2nd

A boneyard filled with destroyed and captured German armour southeast of Falaise.

completely wiped out in the post office, 100 men
from the northern outskirts of the Bois-du-Roi
to the Caen-Falaise road, 20 men at Point 159,
20 men in the wood at U1640, and 50 men in
Les Monts D'Erames. Olbotter still remained
with the 89th Division and had with him still
his two tanks.
30. The only items of interest before Falaise
finally fell were two counter-attacks by Wiinsche
at Epaney and up the Caen-Falaise road. Meyer
also spoke of the last stand of Krause on the
Caen-Falaise road with heavy infantry guns with
which he fought to the end. On 16 August, Falaise
fell, and the remains of the 12th SS took new
positions on the high ground to the south of the
town, extending from Point 182 on the left to
Les Moutiers-en-Auge on the right. These
positions were manned by 120 men and six
tanks. At this stage, Waldmuller came back on

Parachute Corps and Schimpf of the 3rd
Parachute Division, make a concentrated
attempt to break out south of Trun. They
became, however, separated, and all Meyer can
say is that he personally came out of the gap by
himself, led out by a French civilian. Thus ends
the story of the 12th SS and the part it took in
the Caen-Falaise battle. As a formation, it had
been entirely annihilated, and would have ceased
to exist altogether, had not Waldmuller been
withdrawn.
31. It would appear from the past description
as if the 12th SS had been the only formation
that had been responsible for this series of wellfought defensive battles. Meyer spoke as if no
other division, except the 12th SS, had taken
part at all. Of the 89th Division and the 85th
Infantry Division, he spoke little and dismissed
their contribution in a few trite remarks. The
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12th SS was the division, his men had borne
uncomplainingly the burden and heat of the
battle, which in his long experience was the
toughest he had ever fought. He had never
experienced such overwhelming might against
him either from the land or from the air. He
remained to the end intensely proud of the deeds
and exploits of his division, which he reckoned
had never put up a better show.
32. Naturally, therefore, with a man imbued with
such ideas about his own troops, there was little
room left for praise of the other troops who took
part despite the fact that on a number of
occasions both the infantry divisions fought well.
The 12th SS had defended Falaise, the 12th SS
had had the vast sector to defend, the 12th SS
had had the responsibility of saving the German
Army from being completely mopped up and it
had carried out its tasks to the best of its ability,
a n d incidentally, t h a t of the divisional
commander. Thus spoke the fanatic Meyer, the
intrepid young divisional commander.

General Remarks
33. The few general remarks that Meyer had
made on the fighting may be of interest. He said
that there was one thing to which he must draw
our attention, and that was the lack of wireless
security of the Allied forces who opposed him.
It was not only within units that it was bad, but
frequently orders were given over the air by
senior commanders who should have known
better, which he was able to pick up and
immediately initiate counter-measures before the
orders were implemented by the Allied troops.
Frequently, he would get warning of our attacks
in this way, and as frequently, he was able to
neutralize them.
34. A n o t h e r criticism he m a d e was t h e
astonishing amount of valuable material carried
in tanks. Code signs, simple map codes, cover
names for places, not for one day but sometimes
for 3 and 4 days, were frequently found on
captured tanks. In fact, so valuable did this
prove, that it was always an accepted process to
let an Allied tank come into the German lines
before knocking it out, so that these valuable
stocks of codes, etc. could be obtained. On the
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question of our air superiority, he said that he
thought this was one of the greatest factors in
our success, not through our heavy bomber
attacks, but the fighter-bomber, which harassed
him from early morning to dewy dusk. The
attacks on headquarters he confirmed as being
very accurate. His rear headquarters, at one
stage was severely engaged at Urville and many
vehicles were knocked out. At the time of the
attack on his headquarters to the east of BonsTassilly in the Liason Valley, he himself was
within a stone's throw of the building. He saw
the building go up in flames, and stood there,
as an interested eyewitness. Speaking in general
of the fighting on the Liason Valley, he said that
he had exploited the mobility of his tanks, in
order to deceive the Allies of the numbers
available. Directly after a tank had shot, it
immediately changed position, giving the
impression of many more than were actually
there. On the work of the 88s he spoke
enthusiastically, especially of the action at Point
195 when he inflicted a heavy defeat on our own
armour. He never quite understood why we had
let ourselves get into this situation, but he said,
"Once you were in that position, we did not
hesitate to make you pay for it."
35. On the general form of the invasion, he
confirmed exactly what Feuchtinger, commander
of the 21 st Panzer Division, had said respecting
the schemes of Rommel and Rundstedt to defeat
the Allied landings. Rommel wanted everything,
including the armoured forces on the coast, so
that the invasion could be defeated on the
beaches. Rundstedt, however, preferred to have
his armour in reserve and to use it as a mobile
counter-attack force. One last point; during some
of this conversation, Wunsche, commander of
the 12th Panzer Regiment, was present. Slightly
younger than Meyer, decorated like a Christmas
tree, he was a similar example of the system as
Meyer. His ideas and general philosophy of life
were stated in exactly the same terms as those
of Meyer. In appearance he was approximately
6 feet 4 inches in height, broad-shouldered,
though by no means stout. A good-looking man,
blonde, with eyes not unlike Meyer's, and in one
phase the perfect example of Aryan youth as laid
down in the pages of "Mein Kampf."
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